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Abstract

Objective: To evaluate the implementation and outcomes of evidence‐based fall‐risk‐
reduction processes when those processes are implemented using a multiteam system
(MTS) structure.
Data Sources/Study Setting: Fall‐risk‐reduction process and outcome measures from
16 small rural hospitals participating in a research demonstration and dissemination
study from August 2012 to July 2014. Previously, these hospitals lacked a fall‐event
reporting system to drive improvement.
Study Design: A one‐group pretest‐posttest embedded in a participatory research
framework. We required hospitals to implement MTSs, which we supported by con‐
ducting education, developing an online toolkit, and establishing a fall‐event reporting
system.
Data Collection: Hospitals used gap analyses to assess the presence of fall‐risk‐re‐
duction processes at study beginning and their frequency and effectiveness at study
end; they reported fall‐event data throughout the study.
Principal Findings: The extent to which hospitals implemented 21 processes to
coordinate the fall‐risk‐reduction program and trained staff specifically about the
program predicted unassisted and injurious fall rates during the end‐of‐study period
(January 2014‐July 2014). Bedside fall‐risk‐reduction processes were not significant
predictors of these outcomes.
Conclusions: Multiteam systems that effectively coordinate fall‐risk‐reduction
processes may improve the capacity of hospitals to manage the complex patient,
environmental, and system factors that result in falls.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Approximately 3 percent of hospitalized patients fall annually.1,2 Nearly one‐fourth of
these falls result in injury3 with an average associated excess cost of $7000 per injury.4
Regardless of injury, falling can lead to fear that limits mobility and accelerates
functional decline.5 To incentivize safer care, serious fall‐related injuries have been
categorized as a preventable hospital‐acquired condition (HAC) since 2008. There are
now 14 HACs for which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services no longer
reimburse hospitals that receive payment under the Prospective Payment System if the
condition was not present on admission.6 The most recent national evaluation of this
“pay‐for‐outcomes” program revealed limited impact on serious fall‐related injuries. The
incidence of serious fall‐related injuries per 1000 discharges decreased 15 percent from
2010 to 2015.7 In comparison, the incidence of central line‐associated bloodstream
infections and catheter‐associated urinary tract infections decreased 91 and 33 percent,
respectively, per 1000 dis‐charges during the same period.7
Reasons for limited progress in decreasing fall‐related injuries include the
complex etiology of falls and lack of rigorous research regarding the impact of system
interventions8 to adaptively manage this complexity.9 The etiology of falls includes
patient, environmental, and system risk factors. Patient factors include the following:
age >80 years, muscle weakness, history of falls, gait and balance deficits, use of an
assistive device, impaired cognition, urinary frequency/incontinence, and medication
side effects.1,10‐12 Environmental factors include the following: clutter/tripping hazards,
room design, inadequate lighting, and inappropriate furniture heights.1,13 System factors
include the following: the attitude that falls are inevitable,14 inadequate staffing,15 and
poor teamwork, which has been linked to missed nursing care (e.g., assisting
transfers/mobility).16 Additional system factors include not integrating evidence from
multiple disciplines, not using standard fall‐event definitions, and not learning from fall‐
event data.17 Standard fall‐event definitions are needed to aggregate fall‐event data for
benchmarking that reveals the scope of risk to patients and supports resource
prioritization.18
Falls and fall‐related injuries are an outcome of the structure and process of a
health care system. Within Donabedian's19 framework, outcomes are defined as
changes in individuals and populations due to health care, and structure refers to how
care is organized, financed, and delivered. Structure determines a system’s capacity
for work and may be the primary determinant of the quality of care a system can
deliver.19 Process refers to actions taken; how people use structures to produce
outcomes.19 Donabedian’s19 structure‐process‐outcome framework is a system of
interacting elements that is causal in nature—improving outcomes requires innovation in
structure and/or process. A reductionistic focus on one element of a system is
insufficient to mitigate a complex adverse outcome such as a patient fall.20
Consequently, randomized controlled trials of individual processes such as use of

bed/chair pressure sensors,21,22 low‐low beds,23 and patient education24 have not
significantly decreased fall risk. Bundling multiple processes may decrease fall risk by
30 percent, but the ideal combination of processes14 and the most effective
implementation structure remains unknown.25
Effective team functioning is one of the Institute of Medicine's five principles for
implementing health care safety systems that seek high reliability.26 Empirical studies27‐
31
and systematic reviews14,32 of inpatient fall‐risk‐reduction programs has established
that that an interprofessional team is more effective than a nursing‐centric structure to
sustain decreases in fall rates. A team is two or more people with complementary skills
and specific roles who interact to achieve a collective goal.33 However, health care is a
sociotechnical system; human beings work in social structures within complex technical
environments to achieve goals too large and complex for a single team.34 Achieving
large, complex goals requires coordination within and between multiple teams.34
Multiteam systems (MTSs) consist of two or more component teams that interact to
manage complex sociotechnical systems and achieve a collective goal.35 Effective
coordination among component teams within an MTS achieves system goals by
planning, standardizing, and adjusting processes in real time.36 These three elements of
effective coordination—planning, standardizing, and adjusting—ensure accountability
when roles and responsibilities are clarified, predictability when the actions and needs
of others are anticipated, and a shared mental model of how coordinated component
team processes achieve a collective goal37 such as fall‐risk reduction.
A typical health care MTS consists of three interprofessional component teams:
coordinating, core, and contingency teams. Coordinating teams lead the MTS by
managing resources38 and team performance. Team performance management
requires coordinating component team processes and conducting training to improve
team member knowledge and skills.39 Coordination and training are leadership functions
that establish role clarity and accountability,40 which is important when component team
members are temporally (across shifts) and geographically (across departments)
dispersed41 as in fall‐risk‐reduction. Core teams composed of licensed and unlicensed
staff provide direct patient care. Contingency teams, composed of members from
various component teams, conduct debriefs (also known as huddles) to adaptively
manage risk by reflecting on an event.38 Debriefs, and huddles improve MTS
coordination when knowledge is shared across component teams.42,43 The Joint
Commission identifies post fall huddles as a key component of post fall management.44
While it is established that an interprofessional team can re‐duce fall risk,14,27‐32
little is known about the coordination of processes across diverse professionals and
teams that may be needed to adaptively manage the complexity of inpatient fall‐risk‐
reduction. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the implementation of evidence‐
based fall‐risk‐reduction processes and their impact on fall‐related outcomes when
those processes are implemented using an MTS structure.

2 | METHODS
2.1 | Study design
We used a one‐group pretest‐posttest design embedded in a participatory
research framework, which was consistent with the funding mechanism described
below. Participatory research facilitates social change when researchers and
organizations collaborate to solve problems by applying theory to reality.45 This study,
Collaboration and Proactive Teamwork Used to Reduce (CAPTURE) Falls, was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Nebraska Medical
Center.
2.2 | Setting, participants, and procedures
From August 2012 through July 2014, health care professionals in a collaborative
of 16 small rural hospitals in a Midwestern state participated in this research
demonstration and dissemination study funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ). The purpose of this funding mechanism was twofold: (a) to
implement safe practices that demonstrate evidence of reducing errors and risks
associated with health care processes; and (b) to inform AHRQ, providers, patients, and
payers about implementation of safe practices in diverse settings. Of the 16 hospitals,
15 were Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs), which are licensed for 25 beds or less; the
one non‐CAH was licensed for <50 beds. These hospitals were located in 16 unique
counties with an average population of 12 087 per county (Table 1). They had
previously participated in a cross‐sectional survey to assess the quality of fall‐risk‐
reduction in Nebraska hospitals.17 Nebraska is a rural state in which 76 percent of the
84 general community hospitals are CAHs.46 The results of that study revealed the
problem to be addressed in the current study: The risk of falls and fall‐related injuries
was significantly greater among the state's CAHs as compared to its larger hospitals.
We sought to improve fall‐risk‐reduction structure by requiring each hospital to
form an interprofessional coordinating team to lead the fall‐risk‐reduction MTS. In
addition, we developed a system for all hospitals to report, benchmark, and learn from
fall events. Reflecting the complementary skills needed to mitigate patient,
environmental, and system fall‐risk factors, we recommended that each coordinating
team include at a minimum staff from nursing, pharmacy, physical and/or occupational
therapy, and patient safety/quality improvement.17 Consistent with best practices in
quality improvement implementation, we also recommended that teams span the
authority gradient from unlicensed personnel (e.g., certified nursing assistant) to a
senior leader (e.g., director of nursing).47,48

We developed the CAPTURE Falls learning form (Appendix S1) for hospitals to
report inpatient falls via U.S. mail or secure email. This form collected patient,
environmental, and system data, building upon the common format for fall events
developed by AHRQ.49 Thus, a fall was defined as “a sudden, unintended, uncontrolled
downward displacement of a patient's body to the ground or other object” and included
unassisted and assisted falls—when a patient is assisted to the ground by hospital
staff.49 Just three of the 16 hospitals used this definition prior to the study (Table 1).
Levels of injury collected on the form ranged from minor harm to death and were
consistent with those used by the National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators.50
During the first quarter of the study, we conducted site visits to help each
coordinating team develop a customized action plan using a gap analysis completed for

the previous survey17 and to educate them to use the CAPTURE Falls learning form
(Appendix S1). This initial gap analysis assessed presence vs absence of processes
only. The education emphasized reporting assisted falls as system successes because
assisted falls are less likely to result in injury than unassisted falls50 and reporting
assisted falls provides feedback about the effectiveness of training core team members
in safe transfers/mobility. This training facilitates early mobilization of patients, which is
essential to prevent secondary functional decline,51,52 and it should include principles of
postural control, bed mobility, body mechanics, use of devices and lifts,53 and
techniques to assist gait.54
Reflecting the participatory nature of the design, we interacted with coordinating
teams throughout the study by conducting:
• 11 one‐hour learning modules with the collaborative, which were posted in our
online toolkit;55
• 19 half‐hour conference calls conducted monthly with the collaborative to share
lessons learned from reported fall events and to address implementation
barriers;55 and
• quarterly conference calls with each coordinating team to monitor action plan
implementation, reflect about causes of specific falls, identify patterns in
aggregate fall‐event data (e.g., location of falls, absence of interventions), and
overcome implementation barriers.
CAPTURE Falls was a complex social intervention (CSI). By definition, CSIs
consist of multiple components customized to fit an organization’s unique context.
People implement CSIs to improve multiple outcomes by working in teams across
multiple organizational levels.56 CAPTURE Falls was a CSI comprised of multiple
processes that each coordinating team prioritized and adapted to fit their context using
their initial gap analysis. The coordinating, contingency, and core teams implemented
these processes at organization, unit, and patient levels, respectively. Consistent with
best practices to evaluate CSIs, our evaluation procedures:
• assessed the extent to which the intervention was implemented,
• determined whether the relationship between the intervention and outcome(s)
was consistent with theory, and
• established a “causal chain”56 regarding how interventions may produce
changes in outcomes.56,57
We used impact and process theories to guide the planning and evaluation of
this study. Impact theories describe how an innovation will work, and process theories
describe how to plan and organize the innovation.58 Donabedian's19 structure‐process‐
outcome framework was our impact theory. We hypothesized that the MTS structure
would improve organizational capacity to implement and coordinate fall‐risk‐reduction

processes. Rogers’59 five stages of organization in‐novation was our process theory.
We supported coordinating teams to complete the five stages: (a) identify the need for
innovation using baseline fall rates and the gap analysis, (b) match evidence‐based
innovations from collaborative education and the online toolkit to needs, (c) restructure
the organization to implement innovations, (d) clarify fall‐risk‐reduction roles and tasks,
and (e) routinize innovations by conducting audits and changing policy/procedure.
2.3 | Outcome measures
The 16 hospitals reported patient, environmental, and system factors associated
with 347 fall events and postfall huddle data for the 232 of those 347 falls that were
followed by a huddle. We entered these data into a Microsoft® Access database and
clarified inconsistencies and missing data with each coordinating team. We calculated
five fall‐related outcome measures (Figure 1): rates per 1000 patient days for total,
injurious, and unassisted falls during the end‐of‐study period (January‐July 2014); a
repeat fall rate for the duration of the study; and perceptions of the frequency of
reporting all falls (reporting‐fall‐events score) at the end of the study (Appendix S2, p.
6). To calculate fall rates, we requested patient days annually and at the end of the
study. The denominator, total patient days, was the sum of patient days for acute,
skilled, and hospice admissions plus hours patients were under observation divided by
24.17
2.4 | Extent of process implementation measures
During the final quarter of the study, each coordinating team up‐dated their gap
analysis (Appendix S2) to rate the extent of process implementation for coordinating
and core team processes. We com‐pared these measures to the findings from our
quarterly monitoring of each hospital’s implementation progress. We calculated
effectiveness or frequency scores for these processes by aggregating the ordinal
ratings from the final gap analysis (Figure 1 and Appendix S2). There were six
effectiveness scores to assess extent of process implementation by the coordinating
team:
• One coordination‐effectiveness score, which was the sum of the ratings of the
effectiveness of 21 processes using a 5‐point scale (0‐not performed to 4‐very
effective; Appendix S2, p. 2). Coordinating teams used these 21 processes
listed in Table 2 to coordinate the fall‐risk‐reduction program.
• Five training‐effectiveness scores (Appendix S2, p. 3): (a) purpose,
interventions, and outcomes of the fall‐risk‐reduction program; (b) use of the fall‐
risk assessment tool by nursing; (c) safe transfers/mobility; (d) use of mechanical
lifts; and (e) how to conduct postfall huddles.
There were three core team frequency scores, which were the sum of the ratings
of the frequency of implementing evidence‐based processes at the bedside using a 5‐
point scale (0‐never to 4‐always; Appendix S2, p. 5):

• universal bedside frequency score (e.g., patient/family education),
• targeted bedside frequency score (e.g., alarms, toileting schedule, use of a gait
belt), and
• universal organizational frequency score (e.g., communicate fall‐risk status
when patients are handed off across shifts).
There was one measure to assess the extent of process implementation by the
contingency team, which was the postfall huddle rate (the proportion of reported falls for
which a postfall huddle was conducted throughout the study). We used the study fall‐
event database to calculate this rate for each hospital.

2.5 | Statistical analysis
We used SAS/STAT software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute Inc.), to conduct all
analyses. To compare hospital characteristics and fall rates from baseline to end‐of‐
study, we categorized the 16 hospitals into three coordination‐effectiveness levels
based on the distribution of the coordination‐effectiveness score (low, moderate, and
high), which ranged from 40 to 69. Consistent with best practices in evaluating CSIs,
this categorization was intended to reveal variations in implementation and outcomes by
extent of implementation. We used the Kruskal‐Wallis exact test to determine
differences in the medians of the coordination‐effectiveness scores for the 21
coordinating team processes among these three levels. We used Spearman
correlations with exact P values to determine associations between the three-

component team process measure scores and the five fall‐related outcomes. Consistent
with establishing a “causal chain,”56 we used Poisson rate models and nonparametric
regression (due to our small sample size) to establish the direction of change.
Specifically, we sought to model changes in the total, injurious, and unassisted fall rates
due to a 1‐unit increase in a component team process measure score—except for
coordination‐effective‐ness, for which changes were calculated due to a 5‐unit increase
(reflecting the maximum possible score of 84). An offset variable was included in the
Poisson rate models, which accounted for total patient days by entering the natural log
of this variable. We used nonparametric regression to model changes in the re‐peat fall
rate and the reporting‐fall‐events score due to the same incremental changes in
component team process measures. We considered P values <0.05 to be statistically
significant and P values <0.10 to be practically significant, given our sample size of 16
hospitals and the value of recognizing potentially promising evidence.57,60

3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Contextual factors and outcomes by coordination‐effectiveness Levels
There were no differences among the three coordination‐effectiveness levels in
hospital contextual factors or total and unassisted fall rates at baseline (Table 1).
However, baseline injurious fall rates were significantly higher among hospitals in the
low coordination‐effectiveness level (2.4) as compared to hospitals in the moderate
(1.0) and high levels (1.8). During the study, hospitals participated in about two‐thirds of
the 31 educational and feedback activities, and 67 percent of all falls were followed by a
postfall huddle. The five hospitals in the high coordination‐effectiveness level
participated in more study activities and conducted postfall huddles more often than the
other 11 hospitals. End‐of‐study average total, injurious, and unassisted fall rates did
not differ significantly from baseline rates among the 16 hospitals. However, the end‐of‐
study unassisted fall rates were significantly lower among hospitals in the high
coordination‐effectiveness level (2.4) as compared to hospitals in the moderate (3.6)
and low (5.1) levels.
3.2 | Extent of implementation of fall‐risk‐reduction coordination
The 16 coordinating teams rated eight of the 21 coordinating team processes as
at least somewhat effective (Table 2). These eight processes were intended to
standardize the fall‐risk‐re‐duction program (e.g., educate staff to report all falls).
Hospitals varied in how they rated their effectiveness for nine of the 21 coordinating
team processes. These nine processes standardized (e.g., conduct audits) and
adjusted fall‐risk‐reduction processes (e.g., modify fall‐risk‐reduction polices/procedures
based on data) and provided feedback (e.g., inform the front line about actions taken).
Finally, four of the 21 coordinating team processes were rated as less than effective by
all hospitals. These four processes included providing feedback to front‐line staff and
the board and conducting root cause analyses (RCAs) for learning and adjustment.

3.3 | Associations between component team process measures and outcomes
Of the three core team process measures, only the universal bedside frequency
score was significantly associated with an outcome measure (repeat fall rates). All of
the coordinating team process measures were significantly or practically associated with
one or more of the five outcome measures. The contingency team process (the postfall
huddle rate) was practically associated with repeat fall rates (Table 3).

3.4 | Extent of process implementation predicts outcomes
Poisson rate models demonstrated that incremental changes in core team
process measures did not predict changes in total, injurious, or unassisted fall rates
(Table 4). However, the more frequently core teams implemented universal bedside
interventions (e.g., purposeful hourly rounding), the lower were repeat fall rates.
Specifically, nonparametric regression predicted that for every 1‐unit increase in the
universal bedside frequency score, there was a practically significant 0.01 decrease in
repeat fall rates.
Poisson rate models and nonparametric regression demonstrated that
incremental changes in coordinating team process measures predicted changes in all
five outcome measures within the observed data:
• The more effectively coordinating teams planned, standardized, and adjusted
(i.e., coordinated) the fall‐risk‐reduction program, the lower were total, injurious,
and unassisted fall rates. Specifically, for every 5‐unit increase in the
coordination‐effectiveness score, there was a significant 0.86 decrease in
unassisted fall rates and practically significant 0.82 and 0.89 decreases in
injurious and total fall rates, respectively.
• The more effectively coordinating teams trained core teams about the fall‐risk‐
reduction program, the lower were injurious fall rates, and the better were
perceptions that all falls were reported. Specifically, for every 1‐unit increase in
the fall‐risk‐reduction program training score, there was a significant 0.80
decrease in the injurious fall rate and a significant 0.60 increase in the reporting‐
fall‐events score.
• The more effectively coordinating teams trained core team nurses to use the
fall‐risk‐assessment tool, the lower were injurious fall rates. Specifically, for every
1‐unit increase in the fall‐risk‐assessment tool training score, there was a
practically significant 0.87 decrease in the injurious fall rate.
• The more effectively coordinating teams trained core teams in safe
transfers/mobility, the lower were repeat fall rates, and the better were
perceptions that all falls were reported. Specifically, for every 1‐unit increase in
the safe transfers/mobility training score there was a practically significant 0.01
decrease in the re‐peat fall rate and a significant 0.17 increase in the reporting‐
fall‐events score.
• The more effectively coordinating teams trained core team members to use
mechanical lifts and conduct postfall huddles, the lower were repeat fall rates.
Specifically, for every 1‐unit increase in these two training scores, there were
practically significant 0.02 decreases in the repeat fall rate.

Finally, the more often a fall was followed by a postfall huddle (the contingency
team process measure), the lower were repeat fall rates. Specifically, for every 1‐unit
increase in the postfall huddle rate, there was a practically significant 0.53 decrease in
the repeat fall rate.

4 | DISCUSSION
Much of the previous fall‐risk‐reduction research has focused on innovation in
one element of Donabedian's19 framework: structure, process, or incentivizing
outcomes. We sought
to evaluate the impact of fall‐risk‐reduction processes on five fall‐related
outcomes when those processes are implemented and coordinated by an MTS
structure. This approach was intended to decrease the risk of falls in a collaborative of
16 small rural hospitals and address the lack of knowledge regarding the impact of an
MTS structure as a system intervention to decrease fall risk. We found that the
effectiveness of the coordinating team's efforts to manage core and contingency team
performance by coordinating (planning, standardizing, and adjusting) processes and
conducting training predicted the five out‐comes. If we had limited our evaluation to a
baseline vs end‐of‐study comparison of aggregate fall rates (Table 1, column two), we
would have wrongly concluded that the MTS structure and coordination processes had
no impact on fall‐related outcomes. This study may be the first to report an association
between MTS structures and processes and patient level outcomes.

These results have implications for fall‐risk‐reduction quality improvement and
research. First, coordinating team processes predicted total, injurious, and unassisted
fall rates, which are the primary fall‐related outcomes reported in the literature.61 This
finding is consistent with a laboratory simulation, which demonstrated that MTS
performance was explained by the extent of inter‐team coordination conducted by the
leadership (e.g., coordinating) team.39 In addition, this finding supports the use of a
gap analysis to identify deficits in fall‐risk‐reduction coordination and training and the
development of a coordinating team to mitigate these gaps. This finding also
supports conducting annual training for staff about the purpose, interventions, and
outcomes of the fall‐risk‐reduction program and the administration of the fall‐risk
assessment tool since these training efforts predicted injurious fall rates. Finally, this
finding is consistent with continual training and a focus on learning from events as work
practices that support high reliability.62
Second, our results indicate that decreasing the risk of repeat falls may require
coordinated processes conducted by coordinating, core, and contingency teams and
monitoring to ensure each fall is followed by a postfall huddle. This second finding
supports the implementation of an explicit program to train staff to effectively lead and
participate in postfall huddles.
Third, our results indicate that training about the fall‐risk‐reduction program and
training in safe transfers/mobility may increase the likelihood that staff will report all falls,
including assisted falls. These training efforts may increase staff knowledge about the
scope of the fall‐risk‐reduction program and their skill and confidence in mobilizing
patients. Consistent with their knowledge of the physiological and biomechanical
foundations of mobility, physical and/or occupational therapists can conduct training in
safe transfers/mobility and function as integral members of fall‐risk‐reduction
coordinating teams.
Fourth, we believe our results support the use of the MTS structure as a
system intervention consistent with organizing for high reliability.62 High reliability
theory indicates that organizations can operate in complex, hazardous environments
for long periods with‐out catastrophic errors if they are preoccupied with failure,
reluctant to simplify, sensitive to operations, and committed to resilience.63 For
example, the MTS structure supports preoccupation with failure and reluctance to
simplify when coordinating team members con‐duct audits and provide feedback
regarding interventions, core team members report adverse events, and contingency
team members conduct post event huddles. Similarly, coordinating and contingency
teams support a reluctance to simplify when they include members from multiple
disciplines and varying authority gradients who are knowledgeable about front‐line
operations. The MTS structure as described in this study may provide health care
organizations with the capacity to learn from experience and adapt to changing
circumstances, which are defining properties of high reliability organizations.64

Lastly, we agree with Staggs and colleagues50 that the total fall rate should not
be the primary outcome of interest in fall‐risk‐reduction quality improvement and
research because it includes both system failures (unassisted falls) and system
successes (assisted falls). Rather, unassisted, injurious, and repeat fall rates may be
the most appropriate fall‐risk‐reduction outcomes of interest.
Our methods are consistent with best practices to evaluate CSIs.56 We assessed
the extent of intervention implementation using a gap analysis, and we established a
“causal chain”56 by demonstrating that changes in process measures can predict
changes in outcome measures using Poisson rate models and nonparametric
regression. These methods are consistent with Berwick’s57 recommendation to use a
wider range of evaluation methodologies than the randomized controlled trial to
evaluate multicomponent social interventions in health care. Our results are consistent
with our prospective use of impact and process theories to plan and evaluate the study.
Because MTSs are optimal for solving complex sociotechnical problems,65 the MTS
structure appeared to improve organizational capacity to implement and coordinate fall‐
risk‐reduction processes, which predicted fall‐related outcomes. We found that
coordinating team rather than core team (i.e., bedside) process measures predicted
total, unassisted, and injurious fall rates. This finding is consistent with “systems
thinking,” which emphasizes that interactions between system elements (i.e.,
coordination of core and contingency team processes by the coordinating team) are
more important than individual elements in determining system performance.66
Consistent with Rogers’59 five‐stage organization innovation process theory, we found
that hospitals varied in their ability to implement the coordination processes. As
compared to the other 11 teams, the five most effective coordinating teams more fully
implemented the intervention: They participated in the most study activities; more
frequently conducted postfall huddles; and rated themselves as effective in
implementing challenging restructuring and routinizing processes. The latter include
integrating evidence from multiple disciplines, linking targeted interventions to fall‐risk
factors, conducting audits, collecting and analyzing program outcomes data, modifying
polices/procedures based on outcomes, and communicating with front‐line staff and
senior leaders about the program.
4.1 | Limitations and future research
This study has limitations. First, our one‐group pretest‐posttest design cannot
establish causality, and it contains threats to internal validity including history,
maturation, and regression to the mean.67 We sought to limit the impact of these threats
by using evaluation methods appropriate for CSIs. Second, consistent with real‐world
quality improvement and the demonstration nature of the study, process and outcome
measures were voluntarily reported by study hospitals. Third, we made multiple
comparisons among these measures. We did not use the conservative Bonferroni
method to adjust for these comparisons due to the exploratory nature of this
demonstration study.68,69 The Bonferroni method would render nearly all results

insignificant; it would obscure results that vary by extent of implementation, are
consistent with Donabedian's framework,56 and thus appropriate for future research.69
Fourth, the resource‐intense participatory nature of this study required limiting the
sample size to 16 hospitals and may confound our ability to conclude “what works.”
Specifically, MTS research in the real world will likely involve modest sample sizes due
to difficulty accessing and following these teams over time.70 Finally, given that
standard definitions of a fall and fall‐related injury were used by just three hospitals at
baseline, falls occurring during this period may have been under‐reported, which
is consistent with the observed increases in fall rates from baseline to the end‐of‐study
period among hospitals in the low and moderate coordination‐effectiveness levels
(Table 1).
Future research is needed to determine the optimal structure and preparation of
coordinating teams that lead patient safety MTSs. It is likely that the structure and
development of these teams affects their performance.71 In fact, we found that a
coordinating team's reflexivity—their ability to reflect upon their goals and adapt their
strategies to changing circumstances72 was negatively associated with total and
unassisted fall rates.73 Second, we need to under‐stand the barriers to implementing the
restructuring and routinizing processes that teams found challenging (e.g.,
integrating evidence from multiple disciplines, auditing interventions, analyzing data,
con‐ducting RCAs). Finally, we need to know how to adapt this CSI to fit the context of
larger hospitals and if use of the online toolkit55 can achieve similar outcomes without
extensive support from researchers. We must replicate this study as a quality
improvement collaborative in a new sample of hospitals without the extensive support
offered in the participatory research framework.

5 | CONCLUSIONS
Multiteam systems that effectively coordinate processes across diverse
professionals and teams may improve the capacity of hospitals to manage the
complexity of the patient, environmental, and system factors that result in falls.
Implementing an MTS structure is a CSI that may be difficult for hospitals with limited
resources to implement without external support (e.g., expertise in participatory
research or implementation science). However, many patient safety problems are too
complex for individuals or individual teams to solve, thus justifying the effort required to
implement MTSs. Risks may be mitigated and lives saved if we allocate resources to
understanding the social component of patient safety problems and their solutions.65 To
do so, we should train health professions students and practitioners to function
effectively in teams and MTSs as a means to organize for safety62 and avoid a
reductionistic focus on a single structure, process, or outcome when addressing patient
safety problems.
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